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Abstract
We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large pop-
ulation. Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a
random variable of common concern. Individuals choose the eﬀort with which
they search for others from whom they can gather additional information. When
two agents meet, they share their information. The information gathered is fur-
ther shared at subsequent meetings, and so on. Equilibria exist in which agents
search maximally until they acquire suﬃcient information precision, and then min-
imally. A tax whose proceeds are used to subsidize the costs of search improves
information sharing and can in some cases increase welfare. On the other hand,
endowing agents with public signals reduces information sharing and can in some
cases decrease welfare.
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We characterize the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population.
An agent’s optimal current eﬀort to search for information sharing opportunities de-
pends on that agent’s current level of information and on the cross-sectional distribution
of information quality and search eﬀorts of other agents. Under stated conditions, in
equilibrium, agents search maximally until their information quality reaches a trigger
level, and then minimally. In general, it is not the case that raising the search-eﬀort
policies of all agents causes an improvement in information sharing. This monotonicity
property does, however, apply to trigger strategies, and enables a ﬁxed-point algorithm
for equilibria.
In our model, each member of the population is endowed with signals regarding the
likely outcome of a Gaussian random variable Y of common concern. The ultimate utility
of each agent is increasing in the agent’s conditional precision of Y . Individuals therefore
seek out others from whom they can gather additional information about Y . When agents
meet, they share their information. The information gathered is then further shared at
subsequent meetings, and so on. Agents meet according to a technology for search and
random matching, versions of which are common in the economics literatures covering
labor markets, monetary theory, and ﬁnancial asset markets. A distinction is that the
search intensities in our model vary cross-sectionally in a manner that depends on the
endogenously chosen eﬀorts of agents.
Going beyond prior work in this setting, we capture implications of the incentive
to search more intensively whenever there is greater expected utility to be gained from
the associated improvement in the information arrival process. Of course, the amount
of information that can be gained from others depends on the eﬀorts that the others
themselves have made to search in the past. Moreover, the current expected rate at
which a given agent meets others depends not only on the search eﬀorts of that agent,
but also on the current search eﬀorts of the others. We assume complementarity in
search eﬀorts. Speciﬁcally, we suppose that the intensity of arrival of matches by a given
agent increases in proportion to the current search eﬀort of that agent, given the search
eﬀorts of the other agents. Each agent is modeled as fully rational, in a sub-game-perfect
Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
The existence and characterization of an equilibrium involves incentive consistency
conditions on the jointly determined search eﬀorts of all members of the population
simultaneously. We ﬁnd conditions for a stationary equilibrium, in which each agent’s
1search eﬀort at a given time depends only on that agent’s current level of precision
regarding the random variable Y of common concern. Each agent’s life-time search
intensity process is the solution of a stochastic control problem, whose rewards depend
on the optimal search intensity processes of all other agents.
We show that if the cost of search is increasing and convex in eﬀort, then, taking
as given the cross-sectional distribution of other agents’ information quality and search
eﬀorts, the optimal search eﬀort of any given agent is declining in the current infor-
mation precision of that agent. This property holds, even out of equilibrium, because
the marginal valuation of additional information for each agent declines as that agent
gathers additional information. With proportional search costs, this property leads to
equilibria with trigger policies that reduce search eﬀorts to a minimal level once a suﬃ-
cient amount of information is obtained. Our proof of existence relies on a monotonicity
result: Raising the assumed trigger level at which all agents reduce their search eﬀorts
leads to a ﬁrst-order dominant cross-sectional distribution of information arrivals.
We show by counterexample, however, that for general forms of search-eﬀort poli-
cies it is not generally true that the adoption of more intensive search policies leads to
an improvement in population-wide information sharing. Just the opposite can occur.
More intensive search at given levels of information can in some cases advance the onset
of a reduction of the search eﬀorts of agents who may be a rich source of information to
others. This can lower access to richly informed agents in such a manner that, in some
cases, information sharing is actually poorer.
The paper ends with an analysis of the welfare eﬀects of policy interventions. First,
we analyze welfare gains that can be achieved with a lump-sum tax whose proceeds are
used to subsidize the costs of search eﬀorts. Under stated conditions, we show that
this promotes positive search externalities that would not otherwise arise in equilibrium.
Finally, we show that, with proportional search costs, additional public information leads
in equilibrium to an unambiguous reduction in the sharing of private information, to the
extent that there is in some cases a net negative welfare eﬀect.
2 Related Literature
Previous research in economics has investigated the issue of information aggregation.
A large literature has focused on the aggregation of information through prices. For
example, Grossman (1981) proposed the concept of rational-expectations equilibrium
to capture the idea that prices aggregate information that is initially dispersed across
2investors. Wilson (1977), Milgrom (1981), Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997), and Reny
and Perry (2006) provide strategic foundations for the rational-expectations equilibrium
concept in centralized markets.
In many situations, however, information aggregation occurs through local interac-
tions rather than through common observation of market prices. For example, in decen-
tralized markets, such as those for real estate and over-the-counter securities, agents learn
from the bids of other agents in private auctions or bargaining sessions. Wolinsky (1990)
and Blouin and Serrano (2002) study information percolation in decentralized markets.
In the literature on social learning, agents communicate with each other and choose ac-
tions based on information received from others. Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004), for
example, study information aggregation in a social-learning context.
Previous literature has shown that some forms of information externalities may
slow down or prevent information aggregation. For example, Vives (1993) and Amador
and Weill (2007) show that information aggregation may be slowed when agents base
their actions on public signals (price) rather than on private signals, making inference
noisier. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992) show that
agents may rely on publicly observed actions, ignoring their private signals, giving rise
to informational cascades that prevent social learning.
Our paper studies information aggregation in a social learning context. In contrast
to previous studies, we analyze the equilibria of a game in which agents seek out other
agents from whom they can gather information. This introduces a new source of infor-
mation externality. If an agent chooses a high search intensity, he produces an indirect
beneﬁt to other agents by increasing both the mean arrival rate at which the other agents
will be matched and receive additional information, as well as the amount of information
that the given agent is able to share when matched. We show that because agents do not
take this externality into account when choosing their search intensities, social learning
may slow down or even collapse.
In addition to the information externality problem, our paper shows that coordi-
nation problems may be important in information aggregation problems. In our model,
there are multiple equilibria that are Pareto-ranked in terms of the search intensity
employed by the agents. If agents believe that other agents are searching with lower in-
tensity, agents will also search with lower intensity, producing an equilibrium with slower
social learning. Other Pareto-dominant equilibria in which all agents search with higher
intensity may be possible, but it is not clear how agents will coordinate to achieve such
equilibria.
3Our technology of search and matching is similar to that used in search-theoretic
models that have provided foundations for competitive general equilibrium and in models
of equilibrium in markets for labor, money, and ﬁnancial assets.1 Unlike these prior
studies, we allow for information asymmetry about a common-value component, with
learning from matching and with endogenously chosen search eﬀorts.
Our model is related to that of Duﬃe and Manso (2007) and Duﬃe, Giroux, and
Manso (2008), which provide an explicit solution for the evolution of posterior beliefs
when agents are randomly matched in groups over time, exchanging their information
with each other when matched. In contrast to these prior studies, however, we model the
endogenous choice of search intensities. Moreover, we deal with Gaussian uncertainty,
as opposed to the case of binary uncertainty that is the focus of these prior two papers.
Further, we allow for the entry and exit of agents, and analyze the resulting stationary
equilibria.
3 Model Primitives
A probability space (Ω,F,P) and a non-atomic measure space (A,A,α) of agents are
ﬁxed. We rely throughout on applications of the exact law of large numbers (LLN)
for a continuum of random variables. A suitably precise version can be found in Sun
(2006), based on technical conditions on the measurable subsets of Ω × A. As in the
related literature, we also rely formally on a continuous-time LLN for random search
and matching that has only been rigorously justiﬁed in discrete-time settings.2 An
alternative, which we avoid for simplicity, would be to describe limiting results for a
sequence of models with discrete time periods or ﬁnitely many agents, as the lengths of
time periods shrink or as the number of agents gets large.
All agents beneﬁt, in a manner to be explained, from information about a particular
random variable Y . Agents are endowed with signals from a space S. The signals are
jointly Gaussian with Y . Conditional on Y , the signals are pairwise independent. We
assume that Y and all of the signals in S have zero mean and unit variance, which is
without loss of generality because they play purely informational roles.
Agent i enters the market with a random number Ni0 of signals that is independent
1Examples of theoretical work using random matching to provide foundations for competitive equi-
librium include that of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and Gale (1987). Examples in labor economics
include Pissarides(1985) and Mortensen (1986); examples in monetary theory include Kiyotaki and
Wright (1993) and Trejos and Wright (1995); examples in ﬁnance include Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu, and Peder-
sen (2005) and Weill (2004).
2See Duﬃe and Sun (2007).
4of Y and S. The probability distribution π of Ni0 does not depend on i. For almost
every pair (i,j) of agents, Ni0 and Nj0 are independent, and their signal sets are disjoint.
When present in the market, agents meet other agents according to endogenous
search and random matching dynamics to be described. Under these dynamics, for
almost every pair (i,j) of agents, conditional on meeting at a given time t, there is zero
probability that they meet at any other time, and zero probability that the set of agents
that i has met before t overlaps with the set of agents that j has met before t.
Whenever two agents meet, they share with each other enough information to
reveal their respective current conditional distributions of Y . Although we do not model
any strict incentive for matched agents to share their information, they have no reason
not to do so. We could add to the model a joint production decision that would provide
a strict incentive for agents to reveal their information when matched, and have avoided
this for simplicity.
By the joint Gaussian assumption, and by induction in the number of prior meet-
ings that each has had, it is enough that each of two matched agents tells the other his
or her immediately prior conditional mean and variance of Y . The conditional variance
of Y given any n signals is
v(n) =
1 − ρ2
1 + ρ2(n − 1)
,
where ρ is the correlation between Y and any signal. Thus, it is equivalent for the purpose
of updating the agents’ conditional distributions of Y that agent i tells his counterparty
at any meeting at time t his or her current conditional mean Xit of Y and the total
number Nit of signals that played a role in calculating the agent’s current conditional
distribution of Y . This number of signals is initially the endowed number Ni0, and is
then incremented at each meeting by the number Njt of signals that similarly inﬂuenced
the information about Y that had been gathered by his counterparty j at time t
Because the precision 1/v(Nit) of the conditional distribution of Y given the infor-
mation set Fit of agent i at time t is strictly monotone in Nit, we speak of “precision”
and Nit interchangeably.
Agents remain in the market for exponentially distributed times that are indepen-
dent (pairwise) across agents, with parameter η0. If exiting at time t, agent i chooses an
action A, measurable with respect to his current information Fit, with cost (Y − A)2.
Thus, in order to minimize the expectation of this cost, agent i optimally chooses the ac-
tion A = E(Y |Fit), and incurs an optimal expected exit cost equal to the Fit-conditional
variance σ2
it of Y . Thus, while in the market, the agent has an incentive to gather in-
5formation about Y in order to reduce the expected exit cost. We will shortly explain
how search for other agents according to a costly eﬀort process φ inﬂuences the current
mean rate of arrival of matches, and thus the information ﬁltration {Fit : t ≥ 0}. Given
a discount rate r, the agent’s lifetime utility (measuring time from the point of that
agent’s market entrance) is
U(φ) = E
￿
−e
−rτσ
2
iτ −
Z τ
0
e
−rtK(φt)dt
￿
,
where τ is the exit time and K(c) is the cost rate for search eﬀort level c, which is
chosen at each time from some interval [cL,cH] ⊂ R+. We take the cost function K to
be bounded and measurable, so U(φ) is bounded above and ﬁnite.
As we will show, essentially any exit utility formulation that is concave and de-
creasing in σ2
iτ would result in precisely the same characterization of equilibrium that we
shall provide.
The agent is randomly matched at a stochastic intensity that is proportional to
the current eﬀort of the agent, given the eﬀorts of other agents. This proportionality
assumption means that an agent who exerts search eﬀort c at time t has a current
intensity (conditional mean arrival rate) of cbqb of being matched to some agent from the
set of agents currently using eﬀort level b at time t, where qb is the current fraction of
the population using eﬀort b. More generally, if the current cross-sectional distribution
of eﬀort by other agents is given by a measure ￿, then the intensity of a match with
agents whose current eﬀort levels are in a set B is c
R
B bd￿(b). The particular pairings of
counterparties are randomly chosen, in the sense of the law of large numbers for pairwise
random matching of Duﬃe and Sun (2007).
Agents enter the market at a rate proportional to the current mass qt of agents in
the market, for some proportional “birth rate” η > 0. Because agents exit the market
pairwise independently at intensity η0, the law of large numbers implies that the total
quantity qt of agents in the market at time t is qt = q0e(η−η0)t almost surely.
The cross-sectional distribution µt of information precision at time t is deﬁned, at
any set B of positive integers, as the fraction µt(B) = α({i : Nit ∈ B})/qt of agents
whose precisions are currently in the set B. We sometimes abuse notation by writing
µt(n) for the fraction of agents with precision n.
In the equilibria that we shall demonstrate, each agent chooses an eﬀort level
at time t that depends only on that agent’s current precision, according to a policy
C : N → [cL,cH] used by all agents. Assuming that such a search eﬀort policy C is
6used by all agents, the cross-sectional precision distribution satisﬁes (almost surely) the
diﬀerential equation
d
dt
µt = η(π − µt) + µ
C
t ∗ µ
C
t − µ
C
t µ
C
t (N), (1)
where µC
t (n) = Cnµt(n) is the eﬀort-weighted measure, µ ∗ ν denotes the convolution of
two measures µ and ν, and
µ
C
t (N) =
∞ X
n=1
Cn µt(n)
is the cross-sectional average search eﬀort. The mean exit rate η0 plays no role in (1)
because exit removes agents with a cross-sectional distribution that is the same as the
current population cross-sectional distribution. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of
(1) represents the replacement of agents with newly entering agents. The convolution
term µC
t ∗ µC
t represents the gross rate at which new agents of a given precision are
created through matching and information sharing. For example, agents of a given
posterior precision n can be created by pairing agents of prior respective precisions k
and n − k, for any k < n, so the total gross rate of increase of agents with precision n
from this source is
(µ
C
t ∗ µ
C
t )(n) =
n−1 X
k=1
µt(k)C(k)C(n − k)µt(n − k).
The ﬁnal term of (1) captures the rate µC
t (n)µC
t (N) of replacement of agents with prior
precision n with those of some new posterior precision that is obtained through matching
and information sharing.
We anticipate that, in each state of the world ω and at each time t, the joint cross-
sectional population distribution of precisions and posterior means of Y has a density
ft on N × R, with evaluation ft(n,x) at precision n and posterior mean x of Y . This
means that the fraction of agents whose conditional precision-mean pair (n,x) is in a
given measurable set B ⊂ N×R is
P
n
R +∞
−∞ ft(n,x)1{(n,x)∈B} dx. When it is important to
clarify the dependence of this density on the state of world ω ∈ Ω, we write ft(n,x,ω).
Proposition 3.1 For any search-eﬀort policy function C, the cross-sectional distribu-
tion ft of precisions and posterior means of the agents is almost surely given by
ft(n,x,ω) = µt(n)pn(x|Y (ω)), (2)
7where µt is the unique solution of the diﬀerential equation (1) and pn(·|Y) is the Y -
conditional Gaussian density of E(Y |X1,...,Xn), for any n signals X1,...,Xn. This
density has conditional mean
nρ2Y
1 + ρ2(n − 1)
and conditional variance
σ
2
n =
nρ2(1 − ρ2)
(1 + ρ2(n − 1))2. (3)
The appendix provides a proof based on a formal application of the law of large
numbers, and an independent proof by direct solution of the diﬀerential equation for ft
that arises from matching and information sharing. As n goes to inﬁnity, the measure
with density pn(·|Y) converges, ω by ω (almost surely), to a Dirac measure at Y (ω). In
other words, those agents that have collected a large number of signals have posterior
means that cluster (cross-sectionally) close to Y .
4 Stationary Measure
In our eventual equilibrium, all agents adopt an optimal search eﬀort policy function C,
taking as given the presumption that all other agents adopt the same policy C, and taking
as given a stationary cross-sectional distribution of posterior conditional distributions of
Y . Proposition 3.1 implies that this cross-sectional distribution is determined by the
cross-sectional precision distribution µt. In a stationary setting, from (1), this precision
distribution µ solves
0 = η(π − µ) + µ
C ∗ µ
C − µ
C µ
C(N), (4)
which can be viewed as a form of algebraic Riccati equation. We consider only solutions
that have the correct total mass µ(N) of 1. For brevity, we use the notation µi = µ(i)
and Ci = C(i).
Lemma 4.1 Given a policy C, there is a unique measure µ satisfying the stationary-
measure equation (4). This measure µ is characterized as follows. For any ¯ C ∈ [cL,cH],
construct a measure ¯ µ( ¯ C) by the algorithm:
¯ µ1( ¯ C) =
η π1
η + C1 ¯ C
8and then, inductively,
¯ µk( ¯ C) =
ηπk +
Pk−1
l=1 Cl Ck−l ¯ µl( ¯ C) ¯ µk−l( ¯ C)
η + Ck ¯ C
.
There is a unique solution ¯ C to the equation ¯ C =
P∞
n=1 ¯ µn( ¯ C) ¯ C. Given such a ¯ C, we
have µ = ¯ µ( ¯ C).
An important question is stability. That is, if the initial condition µ0 is not suf-
ﬁciently near the stationary measure, will the solution path {µt : t ≥ 0} converge to
the stationary measure? The dynamic equation (1) is an inﬁnite-dimensional non-linear
dynamical system that could in principle have potentially complicated oscillatory behav-
ior. In fact, a technical condition on the tail behavior of the eﬀort policy function C(·)
implies that the stationary distribution is globally attractive: From any initial condition,
µt converges to the unique stationary distribution.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that there is some integer N such that Cn = CN for n ≥ N
and that η ≥ cHCN. Then the unique solution µt of (1) converges pointwise to the unique
stationary measure µ.
The proof, given in the appendix, is complicated by the factor µC
t (N), which is non-
local and involves µt(n) for each n. The proof takes the approach of representing the
solution as a series {µt(1),µt(2),...}, each term of which solves an equation similar to
(1), but without the factor µC
t (N). Convergence is proved for each term of the series.
A tail estimate completes the proof. The convergence of µt does not guarantee that
the limit measure is in fact the unique stationary measure µ. The appendix includes a
demonstration of this, based on Proposition B.13. As we later show in Proposition 5.3,
the assumption that Cn = CN for all n larger than some integer N is implied merely by
individual agent optimality, under a mild condition on search costs.
Our eventual equilibrium will in fact be in the form of a trigger policy CN, which
for some integer N ≥ 1 is deﬁned by
C
N
n = cH, n < N,
= cL, n ≥ N.
In other words, a trigger policy exerts maximal search eﬀort until suﬃcient informa-
tion precision is reached, and then minimal search eﬀort thereafter. A trigger policy
automatically satisﬁes the “ﬂat tail” condition of Proposition 4.2.
9A key issue is whether search policies that exert more eﬀort at each precision level
actually generate more information sharing. This is an interesting question in its own
right, and also plays a role in obtaining a ﬁxed-point proof of existence of equilibria. For
a given agent, access to information from others is entirely determined by the weighted
measure µC, because if the given agent searches at some rate c, then the arrival rate
of agents that oﬀer n units of additional precision is cCnµn = cµC
n. Thus, a ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominant (FOSD) shift in the measure µC is an unambiguous improvement
in the opportunity of any agent to gather information. (A measure ν has the FOSD
dominant property relative to a measure θ if, for any nonnegative bounded increasing
sequence f, we have
P
n fnνn ≥
P
n fnθn.)
The next result states that, at least when comparing trigger policies, a more in-
tensive search policy results in an improvement in information sharing opportunities.
Proposition 4.3 Let µM and νN be the unique stationary measures corresponding to
trigger policies CM and CN respectively. Let µC,N
n = µN
n CN
n denote the associated search-
eﬀort-weighted measure. If N > M, then µC,N has the ﬁrst-order dominance property
over µC,M.
Superﬁcially, this result may seem obvious. It says merely that if all agents extend
their high-intensity search to a higher level of precision, then there will be an unambigu-
ous upward shift in the cross-sectional distribution of information transmission rates.
Our proof, shown in the appendix, is not simple. Indeed, we provide a counterexample
below to the similarly “obvious” conjecture that any increase in the common search-eﬀort
policy function leads to a ﬁrst-order-dominant improvement in information sharing.
The issue of whether higher search eﬀorts at each given level of precision improves
information sharing involves two competing forces. The direct eﬀect is that higher search
eﬀorts at a given precision increases the speed of information sharing, holding constant
the precision distribution µ. The opposing eﬀect is that if agents search harder, then
they may earlier reach a level of precision at which they reduce their search eﬀorts,
which could in principle cause a downward shift in the cross-sectional average rate of
information arrival. In order to make precise these competing eﬀects, we return to
the construction of the measure ¯ µ( ¯ C) in Lemma 4.1, and write ¯ µ(C, ¯ C) to show the
dependence of this candidate measure on the conjectured average search eﬀort ¯ C as well
as the given policy C. We emphasize that µ is the stationary measure for C provided
µ = ¯ µ(C, ¯ C) and ¯ C =
P
n Cnµn. From the algorithm stated by Lemma 4.1, ¯ µk(C, ¯ C)
is increasing in C and decreasing in ¯ C, for all k. (A proof, by induction in k, is given
10in the appendix.) Now the relevant question is: What eﬀect does increasing C have
on the stationary average search eﬀort, ¯ C, solving the equation ¯ C =
P
n ¯ µn(C, ¯ C)Cn?
The following proposition shows that increasing C has a positive eﬀect on ¯ C, and thus
through this channel, a negative eﬀect on ¯ µk(C, ¯ C).
Proposition 4.4 Let µ and ν be the stationary measures associated with policies C
and D. If D ≥ C, then
P
n Dnνn ≥
P
n Cnµn. That is, any increase in search policy
increases the equilibrium average search eﬀort.
For trigger policies, the direct eﬀect of increasing the search-eﬀort policy C domi-
nates the “feedback” eﬀect on the cross sectional average rate of eﬀort. For other types
of policies, this need not be the case, as shown by the following counterexample, whose
proof is given in the appendix.
Example 4.5 Suppose that π2 > 2π1 . Consider a policy C with Cn = 0 for n ≥ 3. Fix
C2 > 0, and consider variation of C1. For C1 suﬃciently close to C2, we show in the
appendix that
∞ X
k=2
Ckµk = C2µ2
is monotone decreasing in C1. Thus, if we consider the increasing sequence
f1 = 0,
fn = 1, n ≥ 2,
we have f ·µC = C2 µ2 strictly decreasing in C1, for C1 in a neighborhood of C2, so we
do not have FOSD of µC with increasing C. In fact, more search eﬀort by those agents
with precision 1 can actually lead to poorer information sharing. To see this, consider
the policies D = (1,1,0,0,...) and C = (1 − ￿,1,0,0,...). The measure µC has FOSD
over the measure µD for any3 suﬃciently small ￿ > 0.
5 Optimality
In this section, we study the optimal policy of a given agent who presumes that precision
is distributed in the population according to some ﬁxed measure µ, and further presumes
3For this, we can without loss of generality take f1 = 1 and calculate that h(￿) = f ·µC is decreasing
in ￿ for suﬃciently small ￿ > 0.
11that other agents search according to a conjectured policy function C. We let C =
P
n Cnµn denote the average search eﬀort.
Given the conjectured market properties (µ,C), each agent i chooses some search-
eﬀort process φ : Ω × [0,∞) → [cL,cH] that is progressively measurable with respect
to that agent’s information ﬁltration {Fit : t ≥ 0}, meaning that φt is based only on
current information. The posterior distribution of Y given Fit has conditional variance
v(N(t)), where N is the agent’s precision process and v(n) is the variance of Y given
any n signals.
Assuming a discount rate r on future expected beneﬁts, and given the conjectured
market properties (µ,C), an agent solves the problem
U(φ) = sup
φ
E
￿
−e
−rτv(N
φ
τ ) −
Z τ
0
e
−stK(φt)dt
￿
, (5)
where τ is the time of exit, exponentially distributed with parameter η0, and where the
agent’s precision process Nφ is the pure-jump process with a given initial condition N0,
with jump-arrival intensity φtC, and with jump-size probability distribution µC/C, that
is, with probability C(j)µ(j)/C of jump size j. We have abused notation by measuring
calendar time for the agent from the time of that agent’s market entry.
For generality, we relax from this point the assumption that the exit disutility is
the conditional variance v(Nφ
τ ), and allow the exit utility to be of the more general form
u(Nφ
τ ), for any bounded increasing concave4 function u(·) on the positive integers. It
can be checked that u(n) = −v(n) is indeed a special case.
We say that φ∗ is an optimal search eﬀort process given (µ,C) if φ∗ attains the
supremum (5). We further say that a policy function Γ : N → [cL,cH] is optimal given
(µ,C) if the search eﬀort process {Γ(Nt) : t ≥ 0} is optimal, where the precision pro-
cess N uniquely satisﬁes the stochastic diﬀerential equation with jump arrival intensity
Γ(Nt)C and with jump-size distribution µC/C. (Because Γ(n) is bounded by cH, there
is a unique solution N to this stochastic diﬀerential equation. See Protter (2005).)
We characterize agent optimality given (µ,C) using the principle of dynamic pro-
gramming, showing that the indirect utility, or “value,” Vn for precision n satisﬁes the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for optimal search eﬀort given by
0 = −(r + η
0)Vn + η
0un + sup
c∈[cL,cH]
{−K(c) + c
∞ X
m=1
(Vn+m − Vn)µ
C
m}. (6)
4We say that a real-valued function F on the integers is concave if F(j + 2) + F(j) ≤ 2F(j + 1).
12A standard martingale-based veriﬁcation argument for the following result is found
in the appendix.
Lemma 5.1 If V is a bounded solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (6)
and the policy function Γ satisﬁes the optimality condition that, for each n and for all
c ∈ [cL,cH],
−K(Γn) + Γn
∞ X
m=1
(Vn+m − Vn)µ
C
m ≥ −K(c) + c
∞ X
m=1
(Vn+m − Vn)µ
C
m,
then Γ is an optimal policy function given (µ,C), and VN0 is the value of this policy.
We begin to lay out some of the properties of optimal policies, based on conditions
on the search-cost function K(·).
Proposition 5.2 Suppose that K is increasing, convex, and diﬀerentiable. Then, given
(µ,C), there is a policy Γ that is optimal for all agents, and the optimal search eﬀort Γn
is monotone decreasing in the current precision n.
In order to calculate a precision threshold N, independent of the measure µ, above
which it is optimal to search minimally, we let u = limn u(n), which exists because un
is increasing in n and bounded, and we let
N = max{n : cH η
0 (r + η
0)(u − u(n)) ≥ K
0(cL)},
which is ﬁnite if K0(cL) > 0. A proof of the following result is found in the appendix.
Proposition 5.3 Suppose that K(·) is increasing, diﬀerentiable, and convex, with K0(cL) >
0. Then, for any optimal search-eﬀort policy Γ,
Γn = cL, n ≥ N.
In the special case of proportional and non-trivial search costs, it is in fact optimal
for all agents to adopt a trigger policy, one that searches at maximal eﬀort until a trigger
level of precision is reached, and at minimal eﬀort thereafter. This result, stated next,
is a consequence of our prior results that an optimal policy is decreasing and eventually
reaches cL, and of the fact that with linear search costs, an optimal policy is “bang-
bang,” therefore taking the maximal eﬀort level cH at ﬁrst, then eventually switching to
the minimal eﬀort cL at a suﬃciently high precision.
Proposition 5.4 Suppose that K(c) = κc for some scalar κ > 0. Then, given (µ,C),
there is a trigger policy that is optimal for all agents.
136 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a search-eﬀort policy function C satisfying: (i) there is a unique
stationary cross-sectional precision measure µ satisfying the associated equation (4),
and (ii) taking as given the market properties (µ,C), the policy function C is indeed
optimal for each agent. Our main result is that, with proportional search costs, there
exists an equilibrium in the form of a trigger policy.
Theorem 6.1 Suppose that K(c) = κc for some scalar κ > 0. Then there exists a
trigger policy that is an equilibrium.
The theorem is proved using the following proposition and corollary. We let CN be
the trigger policy with trigger at precision level N, and we let µN denote the associated
stationary measure. We let N(N) ⊂ N be the set of trigger levels that are optimal
given the conjectured market properties (µN,CN) associated with a trigger level N.
We can look for an equilibrium in the form of a ﬁxed point of the optimal trigger-level
correspondence N(·), that is, some N such that N ∈ N(N). The Theorem does not rely
on the stability result that from any initial condition, µt converges to µ. This stability
applies, by Proposition 4.2, provided that η ≥ cHcL.
Proposition 6.2 Suppose that K(c) = κc for some scalar κ > 0. Then N(N) is in-
creasing in N, in the sense that if N0 ≥ N and if k ∈ N(N), then there exists some
k0 ≥ k in N(N0). Further, there exists a uniform upper bound on N(N), independent of
N, given by
N = max{j : cHη
0(r + η
0)(u − u(j)) ≥ κ}.
Theorem 6.1 then follows from:
Corollary 6.3 The correspondence N has a ﬁxed point N. An equilibrium is given by
the associated trigger policy CN.
Our proof, found in the appendix, leads to the following algorithm for computing
symmetric pure strategy equilibria of the game. The algorithm ﬁnds all such equilibria
in trigger strategies.
Algorithm: Start with N = ¯ N.
141. Compute N(N). If N ∈ N(N), then output CN (an equilibrium of the game). Go
to the next step.
2. If N > 0, go back to Step 1 with N = N − 1. Otherwise, quit.
There may exist multiple equilibria of the game. The following proposition shows
that the equilibria are Pareto-ranked according to their associated trigger levels, and
that there is never “too much” search in equilibrium.
Proposition 6.4 Suppose that K(c) = κc for some scalar κ > 0. If CN is an equilibrium
of the game then it Pareto dominates any outcome in which all agents employ a policy
CN0
for a trigger level N0 < N. In particular, the set of equilibria of the game is
Pareto-ranked with equilibria associated with higher trigger levels dominating equilibria
associated with lower trigger levels.
6.1 Equilibria with Minimal Search
We now consider conditions under which there are equilibria with minimal search, cor-
responding to the trigger policy with trigger at N = 0. The idea is that such equilibria
can arise because a presumption that other agents make minimal search eﬀorts can lead
to a conjecture of such poor information sharing opportunities that any given agent may
not ﬁnd it worthwhile to exert more than minimal search eﬀort. We give an explicit
suﬃcient condition for such equilibria, a special case of which is cL = 0. Clearly, with
cL = 0, it is pointless for any agent to expend any search eﬀort if he or she assumes that
all other agents make no eﬀort to be found.
Let µ0 denote the stationary precision distribution associated with minimal search,
so that ¯ C = cL is the average search eﬀort. The value function V of any agent solves
(r + η
0 + c
2
L)Vn = η
0un − K(cL) + c
2
L
∞ X
m=1
Vn+m µ
0
m. (7)
Consider the bounded increasing sequence f given by
fn = (r + η
0 + c
2
L)
−1 (η
0 un − K(cL)).
Deﬁne the operator A on the space of bounded sequences by
(A(g))n =
c2
L
r + η0 + c2
L
∞ X
m=1
gn+m µ
0
m.
15Lemma 6.5 The unique, bounded solution V to (7) is given by
V = (I − A)
−1 (f) =
∞ X
j=0
A
j (f),
which is concave and monotone increasing.
In order to provide simple conditions for minimal-search equilibria, let
B = cL
∞ X
m=1
(V1+m − V1)µ
0
m ≥ 0. (8)
Theorem 6.6 Suppose that K(·) is convex, increasing, and diﬀerentiable. Then the
minimal-search policy C, that with C(n) = cL for all n, is an equilibrium if and only if
K0(cL) ≥ B. In particular, if cL = 0, then B = 0 and minimal search is always an
equilibrium.
Intuitively, when the cost of search is small, there should exist equilibria with active
search.
Proposition 6.7 Suppose that K(c) = κc and cL = 0. If π1 > 0 and
κ −
η0 (u(2) − u(1))cHµ1
1
r + η0 < 0, (9)
then there exists an equilibrium trigger policy CN with N ≥ 1. This equilibrium strictly
Pareto dominates the no-search equilibrium.
7 Policy Interventions
In this section, we discuss the potential welfare implications of policy interventions. First,
we analyze the potential to improve welfare by a tax whose proceeds are used to subsidize
the costs of search eﬀorts. This has the potential beneﬁt of positive search externalities
that may not otherwise arise in equilibrium because each agent does not search unless
others are searching, even though there are feasible search eﬀorts that would make all
agents better oﬀ.
Then, we study the potentially adverse implications of providing all entrants with
some additional common information. Although there is some direct beneﬁt of the
additional information, we show that with proportional search costs, additional public
16information leads to an unambiguous reduction in the sharing of private information, to
the extent that there is in some cases a net negative welfare eﬀect.
In both cases, welfare implications are judged in terms of the utilities of agents as
they enter the market. In this sense, the welfare eﬀect of an intervention is said to be
positive it improves the utility of every agent at the point in time that the agent enters,
and negative if it causes a reduction in the utilities of all entering agents.
7.1 Subsidizing Search
A policy that may help to attenuate the negative welfare eﬀects of low information
sharing is to institute a tax whose proceeds are used to subsidize search costs.
We suppose for this purpose that each agent pays a lump-sum tax τ at entry.
Search costs are assumed to be proportional, at rate κc for some κ > 0. Each agent is
also oﬀered a proportional reduction δ in search costs, so that the after-subsidy search
cost function of each agent is Kδ(c) = (κ − δ)c. The lump-sum tax has no eﬀect on
equilibrium search behavior, so we can solve for an equilibrium policy C, as before,
based on an after-subsidy proportional search cost of κ − δ. Because of the law of large
numbers, the total per-capita rate τη of tax proceeds can then be equated to the total
per-capita rate of subsidy by setting
τ =
1
η
δ
X
n
µnCn.
The search subsidy can potentially improve welfare by addressing the failure, in a
low-search equilibrium, to exploit positive search externalities. As Proposition 6.4 shows,
there is never too much search in equilibrium. The following lemma and proposition show
that, indeed, equilibrium search eﬀort is increasing in the search subsidy rate δ.
Lemma 7.1 Suppose that K(c) = κc for some κ > 0. For given market conditions
(µ,C), the trigger level N in the precision of an optimal policy CN is increasing in the
search subsidy rate δ. That is, if N is an optimal trigger level of precision given a subsidy
δ, then for any higher search subsidy δ0 ≥ δ, there exists a higher optimal trigger N0 ≥ N.
Coupled with Proposition 4.3, this lemma implies that an increase in the subsidy
allows an increase (in the sense of ﬁrst order dominance) in information sharing. A direct
consequence of this lemma is the following result.
Proposition 7.2 Suppose that K(c) = κc for some κ > 0. If CN is an equilibrium with
proportional search subsidy δ, then for any δ0 ≥ δ, there exists some N0 ≥ N such that
CN0 is an equilibrium with proportional search subsidy δ0.
17Example. Suppose, for some integer N > 1, that π0 = 1/2, πN = 1/2, and cL = 0.
This setting is equivalent to that of Proposition 6.7, after noting that every information
transfer is in blocks of N signals each, resulting in a model isomorphic to one in which
each agent is endowed with one private signal of a particular higher correlation. Recalling
that inequality (9) determines whether zero search is optimal, we can exploit continuity of
the lefthand side of this inequality to choose parameters so that, given market conditions
(µN,CN), agents have a strictly positive but arbitrarily small increase in utility when
choosing search policy C0 over policy CN. With this, C0 is the unique equilibrium. This
is before considering a search subsidy. We now consider a model that is identical with the
exception that each agent is taxed at entry and given search subsidies at the proportional
rate δ. We can choose δ so that all agents strictly prefer CN to C0 (the strict no-search
condition (9) is satisﬁed), and CN is an equilibrium. For suﬃciently large N all agents
have strictly higher indirect utility in the equilibrium with the search subsidy than they
do in the equilibrium with the same private-signal endowments and no subsidy.
7.2 Educating Agents at Birth
A policy that might in principle attenuate the negative welfare eﬀects of low information
sharing is to “educate” all agents, by giving all agents additional public signals at entry.
We assume for simplicity that the M ≥ 1 additional public signals are drawn from the
same signal set S. When two agents meet and share information, they take into account
that the information reported by the other agent contains the eﬀect of the additional
public signals. (The implications of the reported conditional mean and variance for the
conditional mean and variance associated with a counterparty’s non-public information
can be inferred from the public signals, using Lemma A.1.) Because of this, our prior
analysis of information sharing dynamics can be applied without alteration, merely by
treating the precision level of a given agent as the total precision less the public precision,
and by treating the exit utility of each agent for n non-public signals as ˆ u(n) = u(n+M).
The public signals inﬂuence optimal search eﬀorts. Given the market conditions
(µ,C), the indirect utility Vn for non-public precision n satisﬁes the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation for optimal search eﬀort given by
0 = −(r + η
0)Vn + η
0uM+n + sup
c∈[cL,cH]
￿
− K(c) + c
∞ X
m=1
(Vn+m − Vn)µ
C
m
￿
. (10)
Educating agents at entry with public signals has two eﬀects. On one hand, when
agents enter the market they are better informed than if they had not received the extra
18signals. On the other hand, this extra information may reduce agents’ incentives to
search for more information, slowing down information percolation. Below, we show an
example in which the net eﬀect is a strict welfare loss. First, however, we establish that
adding public information causes an unambiguous reduction in the sharing of private
information.
Lemma 7.3 Suppose that K(c) = κc for some κ > 0. For given market conditions
(µ,C), the trigger level N in non-public precision of an optimal policy CN is decreasing
in the precision M of the public signals. (That is, if N is an optimal trigger level of
precision given public-signal precision M, then for any higher public precision M0 ≥ M,
there exists a lower optimal trigger N0 ≤ N.)
Coupled with Proposition 4.3, this lemma implies that adding public information
leads to a reduction (in the sense of ﬁrst order dominance) in information sharing. A
direct consequence of this lemma is the following result.
Proposition 7.4 Suppose that K(c) = κc for some κ > 0. If CN is an equilibrium with
M public signals, then for any M0 ≤ M, there exists some N0 ≥ N such that CN0
is an
equilibrium with M0 public signals.
In particular, by removing all public signals, as in the following example, we can
get strictly superior information sharing, and in some cases a strict welfare improvement.
Example. As in the previous example, suppose, for some integer N > 1, that π0 = 1/2,
πN = 1/2, and cL = 0. This setting is equivalent to that of Proposition 6.7, after noting
that every information transfer is in blocks of N signals each, resulting in a model
isomorphic to one in which each agent is endowed with one private signal of a particular
higher correlation. Analogously with the previous example, we can exploit continuity in
the model parameters of the lefthand side of inequality (9), determining whether zero
search is optimal, to choose the parameters so that, given market conditions (µN,CN),
agents have a strict but arbitrarily small preference of policy CN over C0. We now
consider a model that is identical with the exception that each agent is given M = 1
public signal at entry. With this public signal, again using continuity we can choose
parameters so that all agents strictly prefer C0 to CN (the strict no-search condition
(9) is satisﬁed), and C0 is the only equilibrium. For suﬃciently large N, or equivalently
for any N ≥ 2 and suﬃciently small signal correlation ρ, all agents have strictly lower
indirect utility in the equilibrium with the public signal at entry than they do in the
equilibrium with the same private-signal endowments and no public signal.
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A Proofs for Section 3: Information Sharing Model
Lemma A.1 Suppose that Y,X1,...,Xn,Z1,...,Zm are joint Gaussian, and that X1,...,Xn
and Z1,...,Zm all have correlation ρ with Y and are Y -conditionally iid. Then
E(Y |X1,...,Xn,Z1,...,Zm) =
γn
γn+m
E(Y |X1,...,Xn) +
γm
γm+n
E(Y |Z1,...,Zm),
where γk = 1 + ρ2(k − 1).
Proof. The proof is by calculation. If (Y,W) are joint mean-zero Gaussian and W has
an invertible covariance matrix, then by a well known result,
E(Y |W) = W
>cov(W)
−1cov(Y,W).
It follows by calculation that
E(Y |X1,...,Xn) = βn(X1 + ··· + Xn), (11)
where
βn =
ρ
1 + ρ2(n − 1)
.
Likewise,
E(Y |X1,...,Xn,Z1,...,Zm) = βn+m(X1 + ··· + Xn + Z1 + ··· + Zm)
= βn+m
￿
E(Y |X1,...,Xn)
βn
+
E(Y |Z1,...,Zm)
βm
￿
.
The result follows from the fact that βn+m/βn = γn/γn+m.
Corollary A.2 The conditional probability density pn(·|Y) of E(Y |X1,...,Xn) given
Y is almost surely Gaussian with conditional mean
nρ2Y
1 + ρ2(n − 1)
and with conditional variance
σ
2
n =
nρ2(1 − ρ2)
(1 + ρ2(n − 1))2. (12)
20Proof of Proposition 3.1.
We use the conditional law of large numbers (LLN) to calculate the cross-sectional
population density ft. Later, we independently calculate ft, given the appropriate bound-
ary condition f0, by a direct solution of the particular dynamic equation that arises from
updating beliefs at matching times.
Taking the ﬁrst, more abstract, approach, we ﬁx a time t and state of the world
ω, and let Wn(ω) denote the set of all agents whose current precision is n. We note
that Wn(ω) depends non-trivially on ω. This set Wn(ω) has an inﬁnite number of agents
whenever µt(n) is non-zero, because the space of agents is non-atomic. In particular,
the restriction of the measure on agents to Wn(ω) is non-atomic. Agent i from this set
Wn(ω) has a current conditional mean of Y that is denoted Ui(ω). Now consider the
cross-sectional distribution, qn(ω), a measure on the real line, of {Ui(ω) : i ∈ Wn(ω)}.
Note that the random variables Ui and Uj are Y -conditionally independent for almost
every distinct pair (i,j), by the random matching model, which implies by induction in
the number of their ﬁnitely many prior meetings that they have conditioned on distinct
subsets of signals, and that the only source of correlation in Ui and Uj is the fact that
each of these posteriors is a linear combination of Y and of other pairwise-independent
variables that are also jointly independent of Y.
Conditional on the event {Nit = n} that agent i is in the set Wn(ω), and conditional
on Y , Ui has the Gaussian conditional density pn(·|Y) recorded in Corollary A.2. This
conditional density function does not depend on i. Thus, by a formal application of
the law of large numbers, in almost every state of the world ω, qn(ω) has the same
distribution as the (Wn,Y )-conditional distribution of Ui, for any i. Thus, for almost
every ω, the cross-sectional distribution qn(ω) of posteriors over the subset Wn(ω) of
agents has the density pn(·|Y (ω)). In summary, for almost every state of the world, the
fraction µt(n) of the population that has received n signals has a cross-sectional density
pn(·|Y(ω)) over their posteriors for Y .
We found it instructive to consider a more concrete proof based on a computation of
the solution of the appropriate diﬀerential equation for ft, using the LLN to set the initial
condition f0. Lemma A.1 implies that when an agent with joint type (n,x) exchanges
all information with an agent whose type is (m,y), both agents achieve posterior type
￿
m + n,
γn
γm+n
x +
γm
γm+n
y
￿
.
21We therefore have the dynamic equation
d
dt
ft(n,x) = η(Π(n,x) − ft(n,x)) + (ft◦ft)(n,x)− Cnft(n,x)
∞ X
m=1
Cm
Z
R
ft(m,x)dx,
(13)
where Π(n,x) = π(n)pn(x|Y (ω)) and
(ft ◦ ft)(n,x) =
n−1 X
m=1
γn
γn−m
Cn−m Cm
Z +∞
−∞
ft
￿
n − m,
γnx − γmy
γn−m
￿
ft(m,y)dy.
It remains to solve this ODE for ft. We will use the following calculation.
Lemma A.3 Let q1(x) and q2(x) be the Gaussian densities with respective means
M1 , M2 and variances σ2
1 , σ2
2 . Then,
γn
γn−m
Z +∞
−∞
q1
￿
γnx − γmy
γn−m
￿
q2(y)dy = q(x),
where q(x) is the density of a Gaussian with mean
M =
γn−m
γn
µ1 +
γm
γn
µ2
and variance
σ
2 =
γ2
n−m
γ2
n
σ
2
1 +
γ2
m
γ2
n
σ
2
2.
Proof. Let X be a random variable with density q1(x) and Y an independent variable
with density q2(x). Then
Z = γ
−1
n (γn−m X + γmY )
is also normal with mean M and variance σ2 . On the other hand, γ−1
n γn−mX and
γ−1
n γm Y are independent with densities
γn
γn−m
q1
￿
γn
γn−m
x
￿
and
γn
γm
q2
￿
γn
γm
x
￿
,
respectively. Consequently, the density of Z is the convolution
γ2
n
γn−mγm
Z
R
q1
￿
γn
γn−m
(x − y)
￿
q2
￿
γn
γm
y
￿
dy
=
γn
γn−m
Z +∞
−∞
q1
￿
γnx − γmy
γn−m
, σn−m
￿
q2(z)dz, (14)
where we have made the transformation z = γn γ−1
m y.
22Lemma A.4 The density
ft(n,x,ω) = µt(n)pn(x|Y (ω))
solves the evolution equation (13) if and only if the distribution µt of precisions solves
the evolution equation (1).
Proof. By Lemma A.3 and Corollary A.2,
γn
γn−m
Z +∞
−∞
pn−m
￿
γnx − γmy
γn−m
￿
￿Y (ω)
￿
pm(y|Y (ω))dy
is conditionally Gaussian with mean
γn−m
γn
(n − m)ρ2Y
1 + ρ2(n − m − 1)
+
γm
γn
mρ2Y
1 + ρ2(m − 1)
=
nρ2Y
1 + ρ2(n − 1)
and conditional variance
σ
2 =
γ2
n−m
γ2
n
(n − m)ρ2(1 − ρ2)
(1 + ρ2(n − m − 1))2 +
γ2
m
γ2
n
σ
2
2
mρ2(1 − ρ2)
(1 + ρ2(m − 1))2 =
nρ2(1 − ρ2)
(1 + ρ2(n − 1))2.
Therefore,
(ft ◦ ft)(n,x)
=
n−1 X
m=1
γn
γn−m
Cn−m Cm
Z +∞
−∞
ft
￿
n − m,
γnx − γmy
γn−m
￿
ft(m,y)dy
=
n−1 X
m=1
Cn−m Cm µt(n − m)µt(m)
γn
γn−m
Z +∞
−∞
pn−m
￿
γnx − γmy
γn−m
￿
￿Y (ω)
￿
pm(y |Y (ω))dy
=
n−1 X
m=1
Cn−m Cm µt(n − m)µt(m)pn(x|Y (ω)).
Substituting the last identity into (13), we get the required result.
B Proofs for Section 4: Stationary Distributions
This appendix provides proofs of the results on the existence, stability, and monotonicity
properties of the stationary cross-sectional precision measure µ.
23B.1 Existence of the stationary measure
Proof of Lemma 4.1. If a positive, summable sequence {µn} indeed solves (4), then,
adding up the equations over n, we get that µ(N) = 1, that is, µ is indeed a probability
measure. Thus, it remains to show that the equation
¯ C =
∞ X
n=1
¯ µn( ¯ C)Cn
has a unique solution. By construction, the function ¯ µk( ¯ C) is monotone decreasing in
¯ C , and
η ¯ µk( ¯ C) = ηπk +
k−1 X
l=1
ClCk−l¯ µl( ¯ C)¯ µk−l( ¯ C) − Ck ¯ µk( ¯ C) ¯ C.
Clearly, ¯ µ1( ¯ C) < π1 ≤ 1. Suppose that ¯ C ≥ cH . Then, adding up the above identities,
we get
η
n X
k=1
µk( ¯ C) ≤ η + cH
k−1 X
l=1
Cl ¯ µl − ¯ C
k−1 X
l=1
Cl¯ µl ≤ η.
Hence, for ¯ C ≥ cH we have that
∞ X
k=1
µk( ¯ C) ≤ 1.
Consequently, the function
f( ¯ C) =
∞ X
k=1
Ck ¯ µk( ¯ C)
is strictly monotone decreasing in ¯ C and satisﬁes
f( ¯ C) ≤ ¯ C, ¯ C ≥ cH .
It may happen that f(x) = +∞ for some Cmin ∈ (0, ¯ C). Otherwise, we set Cmin = 0.
The function
g( ¯ C) = ¯ C − f( ¯ C)
is continuous (by the monotone convergence theorem for inﬁnite series (see, e.g., Yeh
(2006), p.168)) and strictly monotone increasing and satisﬁes g(Cmin) ≤ 0 and g(cH) ≥
0. Hence, it has a unique zero.
24B.2 Stability of the stationary measure
Proof of Proposition 4.2. The ordinary diﬀerential equation for µk(t) can be written
as
µ
0
k = ηπk − ηµk − Ck µk
∞ X
i=1
Ci µi +
k−1 X
l=1
Clµl Ck−lµk−l. (15)
We will need a right to interchange inﬁnite summation and diﬀerentiation. We will use
the following known
Lemma B.1 Let gk(t) be C1 functions such that
X
k
g
0
k(t) and
X
k
gk(0)
converge for all t and X
k
|g
0
k(t)|
is locally bounded (in t). Then,
P
k gk(t) ∈ C1 and
 
X
k
gk(t)
!0
=
X
k
g
0
k(t).
We will also need
Lemma B.2 Suppose that f solves
f
0 = −a(t)f + b(t),
where a(t) ≥ ε > 0 and
lim
t→∞
b(t)
a(t)
= c.
Then,
f(t) = e
−
R t
0 a(s)ds
Z t
0
e
R s
0 a(u)du b(s)ds + f0 e
−
R t
0 a(s)ds
and limt→∞ f(t) = c.
Proof. The formula for the solution is well known. By l’Hˆ opital’s rule,
lim
t→∞
R t
0 e
R s
0 a(u)du b(s)ds
e
R t
0 a(s)ds = lim
t→∞
e
R t
0 a(s)ds b(t)ds
a(t)e
R t
0 a(s)ds = c.
The following proposition shows existence and uniqueness of the solution.
25Proposition B.3 There exists a unique solution {µk(t)} to (15) and this solution sat-
isﬁes
∞ X
k=1
µk(t) = 1 (16)
for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. Let l1(N) be the space of absolutely summable sequences {µk} with
k{µk}kl1(N) =
∞ X
k=1
|µk|.
Consider the mapping F : l1(N) → l1(N) deﬁned by
(F({µi}))k = ηπk − η µk − Ck µk
∞ X
i=1
Ci µi +
k−1 X
l=1
Clµl Ck−lµk−l.
Then, (15) takes the form ({µk})0 = F({µk}). A direct calculation shows that
∞ X
k=1
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
k−1 X
l=1
(Clal Ck−lak−l − Clbl Ck−lbk−l)
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
≤ c
2
H
∞ X
k=1
k−1 X
l=1
(|al − bl||ak−l| + |ak−l − bk−l||bl|
= c
2
H(k{ak}kl1(N) + k{bk}kl1(N))k{ak − bk}kl1(N). (17)
Thus,
kF({ak}) − F({bk})kl1(N) ≤ (η + 2c
2
Hk{ak}kl1(N) + k{bk}kl1(N) )k{ak − bk}kl1(N),
so F is locally Lipschitz continuous. By a standard existence result (Dieudonne (1960),
Theorem 10.4.5), there exists a unique solution to (15) for t ∈ [0,T0) for some T0 > 0 and
this solution is locally bounded. Furthermore, [0,T0) can be chosen to be the maximal
existence interval, such that the solution {µk} cannot be continued further. It remains
to show that T0 = +∞. Because, for any t ∈ [0,T0),
k({µk})
0kl1(N) = kF({µk})kl1(N) ≤ η + ηk{µk}kl1(N) + 2c
2
Hk{µk}k
2
l1(N)
is locally bounded, Lemma B.1 implies that
 
∞ X
i=1
µk
!0
=
∞ X
k=1
 
ηπk − ηµk − Ck µk
∞ X
i=1
Ci µi +
k−1 X
l=1
Clµl Ck−lµk−l
!
= 0,
26and hence (16) holds. We will now show that µk(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0,T0]. For k = 1, we
have
µ
0
1 = ηπ1 − ηµ1 − C1µ1
∞ X
i=1
Ciµi.
Denote a1(t) = −η − C1
P∞
i=1 Ciµi. Then, we have
µ
0
1 = ηπ1 + a1(t)µ1.
Lemma B.2 implies that µ1 ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0,T0). Suppose we know that µl ≥ 0 for
l ≤ k − 1. Then,
µ
0
k = zk(t) + ak(t)µk(t) , ak(t) = −η−Ck
∞ X
i=1
Ciµi , zk(t) = ηπk+
k−1 X
l=1
Clµl Ck−lµk−l.
By the induction hypothesis, zk(t) ≥ 0 and Lemma B.2 implies that µk ≥ 0. Thus,
k{µk}kl1(N) =
∞ X
k=1
µk = 1,
so the solution to (15) is uniformly bounded on [0,T0), and can therefore can be continued
beyond T0 (Dieudonne (1960), Theorem 10.5.6). Since [0,T0) is, by assumption, the
maximal existence interval, we have T0 = +∞.
We now expand the solution µ in a special manner. Namely, denote
cH − Ci = fi ≥ 0.
We can then rewrite the equation as
µ
0
k = ηπk − (η + c
2
H)µk + cH fk µk + Ck µk
∞ X
i=1
fi µi +
k−1 X
l=1
Clµl Ck−lµk−l. (18)
Now, we will (formally) expand
µk =
∞ X
j=0
µkj(t),
where µk0 does not depend on (the whole sequence) (fi), µk1 is linear in (the whole
sequence) (fi), µk2 is quadratic in (fi), and so on. The main idea is to expand so that
all terms of the expansion are nonnegative.
Later, we will prove that the expansion indeed converges and coincides with the
unique solution to the evolution equation.
27Substituting the expansion into the equation, we get
µ
0
k0 = ηπk − (η + c
2
H)µk0 +
k−1 X
l=1
Clµl0 Ck−lµk−l,0, (19)
with the given initial conditions: µk0(0) = µk(0) for all k . Furthermore,
µ
0
k1 = −(η + c
2
H)µk1 + cH fk µk0 + Ck µk0
∞ X
i=1
fi µi0 + 2
k−1 X
l=1
Clµl0 Ck−lµk−l,1, (20)
and then
µ
0
kj = −(η + c
2
H)µkj + cH fk µkj−1 + 2Ck
j−1 X
m=0
µkm
∞ X
i=1
fi µi,j−1−m
+ 2
k−1 X
l=1
j−1 X
m=0
Clµlm Ck−lµk−l,j−m. (21)
with initial conditions µkj(0) = 0. Equations (20)-(21) are only well deﬁned if µi0 exists
for all t and the inﬁnite series
∞ X
i=1
µij(t)
converges for all t and all j.
Thus, we can solve these linear ODEs with the help of Lemma B.2. This is done
through a recursive procedure. Namely, the equation for µ10 is linear and we have
µ
0
10 = η π1 − (η + c
2
H)µ1,0 ≤ ηπk − (η + c
2
H)µ10 + cH f1 µ1 + C1 µ1
∞ X
i=1
fi µi.
A comparison theorem for ODEs (Hartman (1982), Theorem 4.1, p. 26) immediately
implies that µ10 ≤ µ1 for all t. By deﬁnition, µk0 solves
µ
0
k0 = ηπk − (η + c
2
H)µk0 + zk 0,
with
zk0 =
k−1 X
l=1
Clµl0 Ck−lµk−l,0
depending on only those µl0 with l < k. Since µ10 is nonnegative, it follows by in-
duction that all equations for µk0 have nonnegative inhomogeneities and hence µk0 is
nonnegative for each k. Suppose now that µl0 ≤ µl for all l ≤ k − 1. Then,
zk0 =
k−1 X
l=1
Clµl0 Ck−lµk−l,0 ≤
k−1 X
l=1
Clµl Ck−lµk−l,
28and (18) and the same comparison theorem imply µk0 ≤ µk. Thus, µk0 ≤ µk for all k .
It follows that the series X
k
µk0 ≤ 1
converges and therefore, equations (20) and (21) are well-deﬁned. Let now
µ
(N)
k =
N X
j=0
µkj.
Suppose that we have shown that µkj ≥ 0 for all k and all j ≤ N − 1 and that
µ
(N−1)
k ≤ µk (22)
for all k. Equations (20)-(21) are again linear inhomogeneous and can be solved using
Lemma B.2 and the nonnegativity of µkN follows. Adding (19)-(21) and using the
induction hypothesis (22), we get
(µ
(N)
k )
0
≤ ηπk − (η + c
2
H)µ
(N)
k + cH fk µ
(N)
k + Ck µ
(N)
k
∞ X
i=1
fi µi
k−1 X
l=1
Clµl Ck−lµk−l. (23)
The comparison theorem applied to (23) and (18) implies that µ
(N)
k ≤ µk. Thus, we
have shown by induction that µkj ≥ 0 and
N X
j=0
µkj ≤ µk
for any N ≥ 0. The inﬁnite series
P∞
j=0 µkj(t) consists of nonnegative terms and is uni-
formly bounded from above. Therefore, it converges to a function ˜ µk(t). Using Lemma
B.1 and adding up (19)-(21), we get that the sequence {˜ µk(t)} is continuously diﬀeren-
tiable and satisﬁes (18) and ˜ µk(0) = µk(0). Since, by Proposition B.3, the solution to
(18) is unique, we get ˜ µk = µk for all k. Thus, we have proved
Theorem B.4 We have
µk =
∞ X
j=0
µkj.
It remains to prove that limt→∞ µk(t) exists. The strategy for this consists of two
steps:
291. Prove that limt→∞ µkj(t) = µkj(∞) exists.
2. Prove that
lim
t→∞
∞ X
j=0
µkj =
∞ X
j=0
lim
t→∞
µkj.
Equation (19) and Lemma B.2 directly imply the convergence of µk0 . But, the next step
is tricky because of the appearance of the inﬁnite sums
∞ X
i=0
fi µij(t)
in equations (20)-(21). If we prove convergence of this inﬁnite sum, a subsequent ap-
plication of Lemma B.2 to (20)-(21) will imply convergence of µi,j+1. Unfortunately,
convergence of µij(t) for each i,j is not enough for the convergence of the inﬁnite sum.
Recall that, by assumption, there exists an N such that Ci = CN for all i ≥ N .
Thus, we need only show that
Mj(t) =
∞ X
i=N
µij(t)
converges for each j .
We will start with the case j = 0. Then, adding up (19) and using Lemma B.1, we
get
M
0
0(t) +
N−1 X
i=1
µ
0
i0 = η − (η+c
2
H)
 
M0(t) +
N−1 X
i=1
µi0
!
+
 
N−1 X
i=1
Ci µi0 + CN M0(t)
!2
.
Opening the brackets, we can rewrite this equation as a Riccati equation for M0 :
M
0
0(t) = a0(t) + b0(t)M0(t) + C
2
N M0(t)
2.
A priori, we know that M0 stays bounded and, by the above, the coeﬃcients a0 , b0
converge to ﬁnite limits.
Lemma B.5 M0(t) converges to a ﬁnite limit at t → ∞.
To prove it, we will need an auxiliary
Lemma B.6 Let N(t) be the solution to
N
0(t) = a + bN(t) + cN
2(t) , N(0) = N0.
30If the characteristic polynomial q(λ) = a + bλ + cλ2 has real zeros λ1 ≥ λ2 then
(1) If N0 < λ1 then limt→∞ N(t) = λ2.
(2) If N0 > λ1 then limt→∞ N(t) = +∞.
If q(λ) does not have real zeros, then limt→∞ N(t) = +∞ for any N0.
Proof. The stationary solutions are N = λ1,2. If N0 < λ2 then N(t) < λ2 for all t by
uniqueness. Hence, N0(t) = a + bN(t) + cN2(t) > 0 and N(t) increases and converges
to a limit N(∞) ≤ λ2. This limit should be a stationary solution, that is N(∞) = λ2. If
N0 ∈ (λ2,λ1) then N(t) ∈ (λ2,λ1) for all t by uniqueness and therefore N0(t) < 0 and
N(t) decreases to N(∞) ≥ λ2, and we again should have N(∞) = λ2. If N0 > λ1, N0 > 0
and hence
N
0(t) = a + bN(t) + cN
2(t) > a + bN0 + cN
2
0 > 0
for all t and the claim follows. If q(λ) has no real zeros, its minimum minλ∈R q(λ) = δ
is strictly positive. Hence, N0(t) > δ > 0 and the claim follows.
Proof of Lemma B.5. Consider the quadratic polynomial
q∞(λ) = a0(∞) + b0(∞)λ + C
2
Nλ
2 = 0.
We will consider three cases:
1. q∞(λ) does not have real zeros, that is, minλ∈R q∞(λ) = δ > 0. Then, for all
suﬃciently large t,
M
0
0(t) = a0(t) + b0(t)M0(t) + C
2
N M0(t)
2 ≥ δ/2 > 0, (24)
so M0(t) will converge to +∞, which is impossible.
2. q∞(λ) has a double zero λ∞. Then, we claim that limt→∞ M(t) = λ∞. Indeed,
suppose it is not true. Then, there exists an ε > 0 such that either supt>T(M(t) −
λ∞) > ε for any T > 0 or supt>T(λ∞ −M(t)) > ε for any T > 0. Suppose that the
ﬁrst case takes place. Pick a δ > 0 and choose T > 0 so large that
a0(t) ≥ a0(∞) − δ, b0(t) ≥ b0(∞) − δ
for all t ≥ T. The quadratic polynomial
a0(∞) − δ + (b0(∞) − δ)λ + C
2
N λ
2
31has two real zeros λ1(δ) > λ2(δ) and, for suﬃciently small δ, |λ1,2(δ) − λ∞| < ε/2.
Let T0 > T be such that M0(T0) > λ∞ + ε. Consider the solution N(t) to
N
0(t) = a0(∞)− δ +(b0(∞)−δ)N(t) + C
2
N N(t)
2 , N(T0) = M(T0) > λ1(δ).
By the comparison theorem for ODEs, M0(t) ≥ N(t) for all t ≥ T0 and Lemma B.6
implies that N(t) → ∞, which is impossible. Suppose now supt>T(λ∞−M(t)) > ε
for any T > 0. Consider the same N(t) as above and choose δ so small that M(T0) <
λ2(δ). Then, M(t) ≥ N(t) and, by Lemma B.6, N(t) → λ2(δ). For suﬃciently
small δ, λ2(δ) can be made arbitrarily close to δ∞ and hence supt>T(λ∞−M(t)) > ε
cannot hold for suﬃciently large T, which is a contradiction.
3. q(λ) has two distinct real zeros λ1(∞) > λ2(∞). Then, we claim that either
limt→∞ M(t) = λ1(∞) or limt→∞ M(t) = λ2(∞). Suppose the contrary. Then,
there exists an ε > 0 such that supt>T |M(t) − λ1(∞)| > ε and supt>T |M(t) −
λ2(∞)| > ε. Now, an argument completely analogous to that of case (2) applies.
With this result, we go directly to (20) and get the convergence of µj 1 from Lemma
B.2. Then, adding equations (20), we get a linear equation for M1(t) and again get
convergence from Lemma B.2. Note that we are in an even simpler situation of linear
equations. Proceeding inductively, we arrive at
Proposition B.7 The limit
lim
t→∞ µkj(t) ≤ 1
exists for any k,j .
The next important observation is: If we add an ε to c in the second quadratic
term, and subtract ε from c in the ﬁrst quadratic term, then the measure remains
bounded. This is a non-trivial issue, since the derivative could become large.
Lemma B.8 If ε is suﬃciently small, then there exists a constant K > 0 such that
the system
µ
0
k = η πk − ηµk − (Ck − ε)µk
∞ X
i=1
(Ci − ε)µi +
k−1 X
l=1
Cl µl Ck−l µk−l
32has a unique solution {µk(t)} ∈ l1(N) and this solution satisﬁes
∞ X
k=1
µk(t) ≤ K
for all t > 0.
Proof. An argument completely analogous to that in the proof of Proposition B.3
implies that the solution exists on an interval [0,T0), is unique and nonnegative. Letting
M =
∞ X
k=1
µk(t)
and adding up the equations, we get
M
0 ≤ η − η M + 2εcH M
2 .
Consider now the solution N to the equation
N
0 = η − η N + 2εcH N
2. (25)
By a standard comparison theorem for ODEs (Hartman (1982), Theorem 4.1, p. 26), if
N(0) = M(0), then M(t) ≤ N(t) for all t. Thus, we only need to show that N(t)
stays bounded. The stationary points of (25) are
d1,2 =
η ±
p
η2 − 8εcH η
4εcH
,
so, for suﬃciently small ε, the larger stationary point d1 is arbitrarily large. Therefore,
by uniqueness, if N(0) < d1, then N(t) < d1 for all t, and we are done. Now, the
same argument as in the proof of Proposition B.3 implies that T0 = +∞ and the proof
is complete.
Since (fi) is bounded, for any ε > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that
fi + ε ≥ (1 + δ)fi
for all i. Consider now the solution (µ
(ε)
k ) to the equation of Lemma B.8. Then, using
the same expansion
µ
(ε)
k =
∞ X
j=0
µ
(ε)
kj,
we immediately get (by direct calculation) that
(1 + δ)
j µkj ≤ µ
(ε)
kj.
33By Lemma B.8,
µ
(ε)
kj ≤
X
k,j
µ
(ε)
kj =
X
k
µ
(ε)
k < K,
and therefore
µkj(t) ≤
K
(1 + δ)j,
for some (possibly very large) constant K, independent of t. Now we are ready to prove
Theorem B.9 We have
lim
t→∞
µk(t) =
∞ X
j=0
µkj(∞).
Proof. Take N so large that
∞ X
j=N
µkj(t) ≤
∞ X
j=N
K
(1 + δ)j < ε/2
for all t. Then, choose T so large that
N−1 X
j=0
|µkj(t) − µkj(∞)| < ε/2
for all t > T . Then, ￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
∞ X
j=0
(µkj(t) − µkj(∞))
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
< ε.
Since ε is arbitrary, we are done.
Lemma B.10 Consider the limit
¯ C = lim
t→∞
X
n
Cn µn(t).
In general,
¯ C ≥
X
n
Cn lim
t→∞
µn(t) = ˜ C,
with equality if and only if X
n
lim
t→∞µn(t) = 1.
Furthermore,
¯ C − ˜ C = CN
 
1 −
X
n
lim
t→∞
µn(t)
!
.
34Based on this lemma, we have
Lemma B.11 The limit µ∞(n) = limt→∞ µt(n) satisﬁes the equation
0 = η(π − µ∞) + µ
C
∞ ∗ µ
C
∞ − µ
C
∞ ¯ C,
where, in general,
¯ C ≥ µ
C
∞(N)
and
µ∞(N) = 1 − η
−1µ
C
∞ ( ¯ C − µ
C
∞ ) ≤ 1.
An immediate consequence is
Lemma B.12 The limit distribution µ∞ is a probability measure and coincides with the
unique solution to (4) if and only if ¯ C = ˜ C.
Proposition B.13 Under the same tail condition Cn = CN for n ≥ N and the condition
that
η ≥ CN cH, (26)
we have
¯ C = ˜ C,
and, therefore, µ∞ is a probability measure that coincides with the unique solution to (4).
Proof. Recall that the equation for the limit measure is
−ηµ∞(k) + ηπk − ¯ CCkµ∞(k) +
X
l
Clµ∞(l)Ck−lµ∞(k − l) = 0, (27)
where
¯ C = lim
t→∞
X
n
Cn µn(t) ≥
X
n
Cnµ∞(n) = ˜ C.
The diﬀerence,
¯ C − ˜ C = (1 − M)CN,
with
M =
X
k
µ∞(k),
is non-zero if and only if there is a loss of mass, that is M < 1.
35Adding (27) up over n, we get
− ηM + η − ¯ C ˜ C + ( ˜ C)
2 = 0
= −η M + η − ¯ C ( ¯ C − (1 − M)CN) + ( ¯ C − (1 − M)CN)
2. (28)
If M 6= 1, we get, dividing this equation by (1 − M), that
M = 1 +
η − CN ¯ C
C2
N
.
Since M ≤ 1, we immediately get that if
η ≥ CN cH,
then there is no loss of mass, proving the result.
B.3 Monotonicity properties of the stationary measure.
We recall that the equation for the stationary measure µ = (µk , k ≥ 1) is
−ηµk + ηπk − Ck µk
∞ X
i=1
Ci µi +
k−1 X
l=1
Cl Ck−l µl µk−l = 0.
We write {¯ µk(C,C1,...,Ck) : k ≥ 1} for the measure constructed recursively in
the statement of Lemma 4.1 from a given C and a given policy C.
Lemma B.14 For each k, the function that maps C to
Ck¯ µk = Ck ¯ µk( ¯ C , C1 , ... , Ck)
is monotone increasing in Ci , i = 1,... , k, and monotone decreasing in ¯ C .
Proof. The proof is by induction. For k = 1, there is nothing to prove. For k > 1,
Ck ¯ µk =
Ck
η + ¯ C Ck
 
η πk +
k−1 X
l=1
￿
Cl ¯ µl)
￿
Ck−l ¯ µk−l)
!
is monotone, by the induction hypothesis.
Steps toward a proof of Proposition 4.3
36Our proof of Proposition 4.3 is based on the next series of results, Lemmas B.15
through B.26, for which we use the notation
νk = νk(C1 , ... , Ck , ¯ C) = Ck ¯ µk( ¯ C,C1,...,Ck)
and
Zk =
Ck
η + Ck ¯ C
.
Note that, multiplying
√
η and Ck by the same number λ does not change the equation,
and hence does not change the stationary measure. Thus, without loss of generality, we
can normalize for simplicity to the case η = 1.
Lemma B.15 The sequence νk satisﬁes
ν1 = Z1π1,
νk = Zk
 
πk +
k−1 X
l=1
νl νk−l
!
,
and
∞ X
k=1
νk(C1 , ... , Ck , ¯ C) = ¯ C. (29)
Diﬀerentiating (29) with respect to Ck, we get
Lemma B.16
∂ ¯ C
∂Ck
=
P∞
i=k
∂νi
∂Ck
1 −
P∞
i=1
∂νi
∂ ¯ C
.
We now let ¯ C(C) denote the unique solution of the equation (29), and for any
policy C we deﬁne
ξk(C) = νk(C1,...,Ck , ¯ C(C)).
Lemma B.17 Let m < k . We have
∂
∂Cm
∞ X
i=k
ξi ≥ 0
if and only if
 
1 −
k−1 X
i=1
∂νi
∂ ¯ C
!
∞ X
i=k
C
2
m
∂νi
∂Cm
≥
 
k−1 X
i=1
C
2
m
∂νi
∂Cm
!
∞ X
i=k
￿
−
∂νi
∂ ¯ C
￿
. (30)
37Proof. We have
∂
∂Cm
∞ X
i=k
ξi =
∞ X
i=k
￿
∂νi
∂Cm
+
∂νi
∂ ¯ C
∂ ¯ C
∂Cm
￿
=
￿
1 −
P∞
i=1
∂νi
∂ ¯ C
￿ P∞
i=k
∂νi
∂Cm +
P∞
i=k
∂νi
∂ ¯ C
￿Pk−1
i=m +
P∞
i=k
￿
∂νi
∂Cm
1 −
P∞
i=1
∂νi
∂ ¯ C
=
￿
1 −
Pk−1
i=1
∂νi
∂ ¯ C
￿ P∞
i=k
∂νi
∂Cm +
P∞
i=k
∂νi
∂ ¯ C
Pk−1
i=m
∂νi
∂Cm
1 −
P∞
i=1
∂νi
∂ ¯ C
,
and the claim follows.
Suppose now that we have the “ﬂat-tail” condition that for some N, Cn = CN
for all n ≥ N . We deﬁne the moment-generating function m(·) of ν by
m(x) =
∞ X
i=1
νi x
i. (31)
By deﬁnition, the ﬁrst N−1 coeﬃcients νi of the power series expansion of m(x) satisfy
ν1 = π1 Z1x
and then
νi =
 
πi +
i−1 X
l=1
νl νi−l
!
Zi
for i ≤ N − 1, and
νi = ZN
 
πi +
i−1 X
l=1
νl νi−l
!
for i ≥ N . For N ≥ 2, let
m
b(x,N) =
∞ X
i=N
πi x
i.
Using Lemma B.15 and comparing the coeﬃcients in the powers-series expansions, we
get
Lemma B.18 If Cn = CN for all n ≥ N , then
m(x) −
N−1 X
i=1
νi x
i = ZN
 
m
b(x,N) + m
2(x) −
N−1 X
i=2
x
i
i−1 X
l=1
νl νi−l
!
.
38Thus,
0 = ZN
 
m
b(x,N) + m
2(x) −
N−1 X
i=2
x
i
i−1 X
l=1
νl νi−l
!
− m(x) +
N−1 X
i=1
νi x
i
= ZN
 
m
b(x,N) + m
2(x) −
N−1 X
i=2
x
i
i−1 X
l=1
νl νi−l
!
− m(x) + π1 Z1 x +
N−1 X
i=2
Zi
 
πi +
i−1 X
l=1
νl νi−l
!
x
i
= ZN m
2(x) − m(x) + ZN
 
m
b(x,N) +
N−1 X
i=2
πi x
i −
N−1 X
i=2
 
πi +
i−1 X
l=1
νl νi−l
!
x
i
!
+ π1 Z1 x +
N−1 X
i=2
Zi
 
πi +
i−1 X
l=1
νl νi−l
!
x
i
= ZN m
2(x) − m(x) + ZN m
b(x,2) + π1 Z1x
+
N−1 X
i=2
x
i (Zi − ZN)
 
πi +
i−1 X
l=1
νl νi−l
!
.
Solving this quadratic equation for m(x) and picking the branch that satisﬁes m(0) = 0,
we arrive at
Lemma B.19 The moment generating function m(·) of ν is given by
m(x) =
1 −
p
1 − 4ZNM(x)
2ZN
, (32)
where
M(x) = ZN m
b(x,2) + π1 Z1 x +
N−1 X
i=2
x
i (Zi − ZN)
 
πi +
i−1 X
l=1
νl νi−l
!
.
The derivatives of the functions Zk satisfy interesting algebraic identities, sum-
marized in
Lemma B.20 We have Zk < 1 for all k. Moreover,
C
2
k
∂Zk
∂Ck
= −
∂Zk
∂ ¯ C
= Z
2
k.
39These identities allow us to calculate derivatives is an elegant form. Let
γ(x) = (1 − 4ZN ζ(x))
−1/2,
with
ζ(x) = ZN m
b(x,2) + π1 Z1x +
N−1 X
i=2
x
i (Zi − ZN)
 
πi +
i−1 X
l=1
νl νi−l
!
. (33)
Diﬀerentiating identity (32) with respect to ¯ C and CN−1 and using Lemma B.20, we
arrive at
Lemma B.21 We have
−
∂m(x)
∂ ¯ C
= −
1
2
+ γ(x)
 
1
2
+
N−1 X
i=1
x
i Zi (Zi − ZN)
 
πi +
i−1 X
l=1
νl νi−l
!
+
N−1 X
i=2
x
i (Zi − ZN)
−∂
∂ ¯ C
i−1 X
l=1
νl νi−l
!
(34)
and
∂m(x)
∂CN−1
= γ(x)x
N−1 Z
2
N−1
 
πN−1 +
N−2 X
l=1
νl νN−1−l
!
. (35)
Let now
γ(x) =
∞ X
j=0
γj x
j, (36)
and let γj = 0 for j < 0.
Lemma B.22 We have γj ≥ 0 for all j .
Proof. By (33), the function ζ(·) has nonnegative Taylor coeﬃcients. Thus, it suﬃces
to show that the function that maps x to (1−x)−1/2 has nonnegative Taylor coeﬃcients.
We have
(1 − x)
−1/2 = 1 +
∞ X
k=1
x
k βk,
with
βk = (−1)
k (−0.5)(−0.5 − 1)(−0.5 − 2)···(−0.5 − k + 1)
k!
=
(0.5)(0.5 + 1)(0.5 + 2)···(+0.5 + k − 1)
k!
> 0.
40Therefore,
γ(x) = 1 +
∞ X
k=1
βk (4ZNζ(x))
k
also has nonnegative Taylor coeﬃcients.
Let
QN−1 =
N−2 X
l=1
νl νN−1−l + πN−1.
Deﬁne also
R0 =
1
2
, R1 = Z1 (Z1 − ZN)π1,
and
Ri = (Zi − ZN)
 
νi +
−∂
∂ ¯ C
i−1 X
l=1
νl νi−l
!
.
Recall that Zi > ZN if and only if Ci > CN and therefore, Ri ≥ 0 for all i as soon
as Ci ≥ CN for all i ≤ N − 1.
Lemma B.23 We have
∂νj
∂CN−1
= Z
2
N−1 QN−1 γj−N+1
and
−
∂νj
∂ ¯ C
=
N−1 X
i=0
Ri γj−i = Z
−2
N−1Q
−1
N−1
N−1 X
i=0
Ri
∂νj−i+N−1
∂CN−1
.
Proof. Identity (34) implies that
−∂m(x)
∂ ¯ C
=
∞ X
j=1
x
j
N−1 X
i=0
Ri γj−i.
On the other hand, by (31),
−∂m(x)
∂ ¯ C
=
∞ X
j=1
x
j −∂νj
∂ ¯ C
.
Comparing Taylor coeﬃcients in the above identities, we get the required result. The
case of the derivative ∂/∂CN−1 is analogous.
Lemma B.24 We have
(R0 + ··· + RN−1)Z
−2
N−1Q
−1
N−1
∞ X
j=k
∂νj
∂CN−1
≥
∞ X
j=k
−∂νj
∂ ¯ C
41and
R0 γ0 +
k−1 X
i=1
−∂νj
∂ ¯ C
≥ (R0 + ··· + RN−1)Z
−2
N−1Q
−1
N−1
k−1 X
j=1
∂νj
∂CN−1
.
Proof. By Lemma B.23,
∞ X
j=k
−∂νj
∂ ¯ C
=
∞ X
j=k
N−1 X
i=0
Ri γj−i
=
N−1 X
i=0
Ri
∞ X
j=k−i
γj
≤
N−1 X
i=0
Ri
∞ X
j=k−N+1
γj
= (R0 + ··· + RN−1)Z
−2
N−1 Q
−1
N−1
∞ X
j=k
∂νj
∂CN−1
and
R0 γ0 +
k−1 X
j=1
−∂νj
∂ ¯ C
= R0γ0 +
k−1 X
j=1
N−1 X
i=0
Ri γj−i
= R0
k−1 X
i=0
γj +
N−1 X
i=1
Ri
k−1−i X
j=0
γi
≥ (R0 + ··· + RN−1)
k−N+1 X
j=0
γj
= (R0 + ··· + RN−1)Z
−2
N−1Q
−1
N−1
k−1 X
j=1
∂νj
∂CN−1
.
By deﬁnition, R0 = 1/2 and γ0 = 1. Hence, we get
Lemma B.25 Suppose that Ci ≥ CN for all i ≤ N and Ci = CN for all i ≥ N .
Then, for all m ≥ N ,
 
1 −
m−1 X
i=1
∂νi
∂ ¯ C
!
∞ X
k=m
∂νi
∂CN−1
≥
m−1 X
i=N−1
∂νi
∂CN−1
∞ X
k=m
−∂νi
∂ ¯ C
.
Lemma B.26 The function λ deﬁned by
λn((Ci)) =
∞ X
i=n
ξi((Ci))
is monotone increasing in Ck for all k ≥ n.
42Proof. By Proposition 4.4,
λ1 = ¯ C =
∞ X
i=1
ξi
is monotone increasing in Ck for each k. By Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 4.4, ξi =
¯ µi(C1,...,Ci−1, ¯ C) is monotone decreasing in Ck for all k ≥ i. Thus,
λn = ¯ C −
n−1 X
i=1
ξi
is monotone increasing in Ck .
We are now ready to prove Proposition 4.3.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. It suﬃces to prove the claim for the case N = M + 1.
It is known that µC,N dominates µC,M is the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
if and only if
∞ X
i=k
µ
C,N
i ≥
∞ X
i=k
µ
C,M
i (37)
for any k ≥ 1. The only diﬀerence between policies CM and CM+1 is that
C
M+1
M = cH > cL = C
M
M.
By Lemma B.26, (37) holds for any k ≤ M . By Lemmas B.17 and B.25, this is also
true for k > M . The proof of Proposition 4.3 is complete.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. By Lemma B.14, the function f that maps ( ¯ C,C) to
f( ¯ C , (Ci , i ≥ 1)) =
∞ X
k=1
Ck ¯ µk( ¯ C,C1,... , Ck)
is monotone increasing in Ci and decreasing in ¯ C . Therefore, given C, the unique
solution ¯ C to the equation
¯ C − f( ¯ C , (Ci , i ≥ 1)) = 0 (38)
is monotone increasing in Ci for all i.
Proof of Example 4.5 of non-monotonicity
Let Cn = 0 for n ≥ 3, as stipulated. We will check the condition
∂ν2
∂C1
> 0.
43By the above, we need to check that
￿
1 −
∂ν1
∂ ¯ C
￿
∂ν2
∂C1
>
∂ν1
∂C1
−∂νj
∂ ¯ C
.
We have
ν1 = π1 Z1
and
ν2 = (π2 + (π1 Z1)
2)Z2.
Since νi = 0 for i ≥ 2, using the properties of the function Zk, the inequality takes the
form
(1 + π1 Z
2
1)C
−2
1 π1 π1 2Z
3
1 Z2 > C
−2
1 π1 Z
2
1
￿
π2Z
2
2 + π1 π1 2Z
3
1 Z2 + (π1Z1)
2 Z
2
2
￿
.
Opening the brackets,
π1 π1 2Z
3
1 Z2 > π1 Z
2
1
￿
π2Z
2
2 + (π1Z1)
2 Z
2
2
￿
.
Consider the case C1 = C2 in which Z1 = Z2. Then, the inequality takes the form
2π1 > π2 + (π1 Z1)
2.
If π2 > 2π1, this cannot hold.
C Proofs for Section 5, Optimality
Proof of Lemma 5.1.
Let φ be any search-eﬀort process, and let
θ
φ
t = −
Z t
0
e
−rsK(φs)ds + e
−rtV (N
φ
t ), t < τ
= −
Z τ
0
e
−rsK(φs)ds + e
−rτu(N
φ
τ ), t ≥ τ.
By Itˆ o’s Formula and the fact that V solves the HJB equation (6), θφ is a super-
martingale, so
V (Ni0) = θ
φ
0 ≥ U(φ). (39)
For the special case of φ∗
t = Γ(Nt), where N satisﬁes the stochastic diﬀerential
equation associated with the speciﬁed search-eﬀort policy function Γ, the HJB equation
implies that θ∗ = θφ∗
is actually a martingale. Thus,
V (Ni0) = θ
∗
0 = E(θ
∗
τ) = U(φ
∗).
It follows from (39) that U(φ∗) ≥ U(φ) for any control φ.
44Lemma C.1 The operator M : `∞ → `∞ , deﬁned by
(MV )n = max
c
 
η0u(n) − K(c)
c ¯ C + r + η0 +
c
c ¯ C + r + η0
∞ X
m=1
Vn+m Cm µ
C
m
!
, (40)
is a contraction, satisfying, for candidate value functions V1 and V2,
kMV1 − MV2k∞ ≤
cH ¯ C
cH ¯ C + r + η0.
In addition, M is monotonicity preserving.
Proof. The fact that M preserves monotonicity follows because the pointwise maximum
of two monotone increasing functions is also monotone. Now we provide the contraction
argument. Let
McVn =
η0 u(n) − K(c)
c ¯ C + r + η0 +
c
c ¯ C + r + η0
∞ X
m=1
Vn+m Cm µ
C
m. (41)
Let
MV1(n) = Mc1V1(n)
and
MV2(n) = Mc2V2(n),
and assume without loss of generality that MV1(n) ≤ MV2(n). Then,
0 ≤ MV2(n) − MV1(n)
= Mc2V2(n) − Mc1V1(n)
≤ Mc2V2(n) − Mc2V1(n)
=
c2
c2 ¯ C + r + η0
∞ X
m=1
(V2 − V1)n+m Cm µ
C
m,
and the estimate immediately follows.
The contraction mapping theorem implies the
Corollary C.2 The value function V is the unique ﬁxed point of M and is a monotone
increasing function.
Lemma C.3 Let
L = {V ∈ `∞ : Vn − (r + η
0)
−1η
0 un is monotone decreasing}.
If u(·) is concave, then the operator M maps L into itself. Consequently, the unique
ﬁxed point of M also belongs to L.
45Proof. Suppose that V ∈ L. Using the identity
u(n)
c ¯ C + r + η0 −
u(n)
r + η0 = −
u(n)
r + η0
c ¯ C
c ¯ C + r + η0,
we get
McVn −
η0 un
r + η0
=
η0 un − K(c)
c ¯ C + r + η0 +
c
c ¯ C + r + η0
∞ X
m=1
Vn+m Cm µ
C
m
=
−K(c)
c ¯ C + r + η0 +
c
c ¯ C + r + η0
∞ X
m=1
￿
Vn+m −
η0 un+m
r + η0 +
η0 un+m − η0 un
r + η0
￿
Cm µ
C
m.
Since V ∈ L and u is concave, the sequences
Dn =
∞ X
m=1
￿
Vn+m −
η0un+m
r + η0 +
η0un+m − η0un
r + η0
￿
Cm µ
C
m (42)
=
∞ X
m=1
Vn+m Cm µ
C
m −
η0 un
r + η0 (43)
and
Bn =
∞ X
m=1
￿
Vn+m −
η0 un+m
r + η0 +
η0 un+m − η0 un
r + η0
￿
Cm µ
C
m (44)
=
∞ X
m=1
Vn+m Cm µ
C
m −
¯ C η0 un
r + η0 (45)
are monotone decreasing. Since the maximum of decreasing sequences is again decreas-
ing, the sequence
(MV )n −
η0 un
r + η0 = max
c
(McV )n −
η0 un
r + η0
is decreasing, proving the result.
We will need the following auxiliary
Lemma C.4 If K(c) is a convex diﬀerentiable function, then c 7→ K(c) − K0(c)c is
monotone decreasing for c > 0.
Proof. For any c and b in [cL,cH] with c ≥ b, using ﬁrst the convexity property that
K(c)−K(b) ≤ K0(c)(c−b) and then the fact that the derivative of a convex function is
an increasing function, we have
(K(c) − K
0(c)c) − (K(b) − K
0(b)b) ≤ K
0(c)(c − b) − K
0(c)c + K
0(b)b
= b(K
0(b) − K
0(c)) ≤ 0,
46the desired result.
Proposition C.5 Suppose that the search cost function K is convex, diﬀerentiable, and
increasing. Given (µ,C), any optimal search-eﬀort policy function Γ(·) is monotone
decreasing. If K(c) = κc for some κ > 0, then there is an optimal policy of the trigger
form.
Proof. The optimal V solves the alternative Bellman equation
Vn = max
c
 
η0un − K(c)
c ¯ C + r + η0 +
c
c ¯ C + r + η0
∞ X
m=1
Vn+mCm µ
C
m
!
. (46)
We want to solve
max
c
f(c) = max
c
η0u(n) + cYn − K(c)
c ¯ C + r + η0
with
Yn =
∞ X
m=1
Vn+m Cm µ
C
m .
Then,
f
0(c) =
(Yn(r + η0) − η0 u(n) ¯ C) + ¯ C (K(c) − K0(c)c) − (r + η0)K0(c)
(c ¯ C + r + η0)2 .
By Lemma C.4, the function K(c) − K0(c)c is monotone decreasing and the function
−(r + η0)K0(c) is decreasing because K(·) is convex. Therefore, the function
¯ C (K(c) − K
0(c)c) − (r + η
0)K
0(c)
is also monotone decreasing. There are three possibilities. If the unique solution zn to
¯ C (K(zn) − K
0(zn)zn) − (r + η
0)K
0(zn) + (Yn(r + η
0) − η
0u(n) ¯ C) = 0
belongs to the interval [cL,cH], then f0(c) is positive for c < zn and is negative for c > zn .
Therefore, f(c) attains its global maximum at zn and the optimum is cn = zn . If
¯ C (K(c) − K
0(c)c) − (r + η
0)K
0(c) + (Yn(r + η
0) − η
0 u(n) ¯ C) > 0
for all c ∈ [cL,cH] then f0(c) > 0, so f is increasing and the optimum is c = cH .
Finally, if
¯ C (K(c) − K
0(c)c) − (r + η
0)K
0(c) + (Yn(r + η
0) − η
0 u(n) ¯ C) < 0
47for all c ∈ [cL,cH] then f0(c) < 0, so f is decreasing and the optimum is c = cL . By
(44), the sequence
Yn(r + η
0) − ¯ C η
0 u(n) = (r + η
0)Bn
is monotone decreasing. The above analysis directly implies that the optimal policy is
then also decreasing.
If K is linear, it follows from the above that the optimum is cH if Yn(r + η0) −
¯ C η0u(n) > 0 and cL if Yn(r + η0) − ¯ C η0u(n) < 0. Thus, we have a trigger policy.
Proof of Proposition 5.3. Using the fact that
(r + η
0)Vn = sup
c∈[cL,cH]
η
0 un − K(c) + c
∞ X
m=1
(Vn+m − Vn)Cm µm,
which is a concave maximization problem over a convex set, the supremum is achieved
at cL if and only if some element of the supergradient of the objective function at cL
includes zero or a negative number. (See Rockafellar (1970).) This is the case provided
that
∞ X
m=1
(Vn+m − Vn)Cm µm ≤ K
0(cL),
where K0(cL). By Lemma C.3,
∞ X
m=1
(Vn+m − Vn)Cm µm ≤ η
0 (r + η
0)
∞ X
m=1
(un+m − un)Cm µm
≤ η
0(r + η
0)
∞ X
m=1
(u − un)Cm µm
< K
0(cL), for n > N,
completing the proof.
D Proofs for Section 6: Equilibrium
This appendix contains proofs of the results in Section 6.
D.1 Monotonicity of the Value Function in Other Agents’ Trigger Level
From the results of the Section 5, we can restrict attention to equilibria in the form of
a trigger policy CN, with trigger precision level N. For any constant c in [cL,cH], we
48deﬁne the operator LN
c , at any bounded increasing sequence g, by
(L
N
c g)n =
1
c2
H + η0 + r
(
η
0un − K(c) + (c
2
H − c ¯ C
N)gn + c
∞ X
m=1
gn+mC
N
mµ
N
m
)
,
where
¯ C
N =
∞ X
i=1
C
N
i µ
N
i .
Lemma D.1 Given (µN,CN), the value function V N of any given agent solves
V
N
n = sup
c∈{cL ,cH}
￿
L
N
c V
N
n
￿
.
Lemma D.2 The operator LN
c is monotone increasing in N. That is, for any increasing
sequence g ,
L
N+1
c g ≥ L
N
c g.
Proof. It is enough to show that if f(n) and g(n) are increasing functions with f(n) ≥
g(n), then LN+1
c f(n) ≥ LN
c g(n). For that it suﬃces to show that
(c
2
H − c ¯ C
N+1)f(n) + c
∞ X
m=1
f(n + m)C
N+1
m µ
N+1
m
≥ (c
2
H − c ¯ C
N)g(n) + c
∞ X
m=1
g(n + m)C
N
mµ
N
m. (47)
Because f and g are increasing and f ≥ g, inequality (47) holds because
∞ X
m=k
C
N+1
m µ
N+1
m ≥
∞ X
m=k
C
N
mµ
N
m
for all k ≥ 1, based on Proposition 4.3.
Proposition D.3 If N0 ≥ N, then V N0
(n) ≥ V N(n) for all n.
Proof. Let
L
NV = sup
c∈[cL ,cH]
L
N
c V.
By Lemmas D.1 and D.2,
V
N0
= L
N0
V
N0
≥ L
N V
N0
.
49Thus, for any c ∈ [cL , cH],
V
N0
(n) ≥ L
N
c V
N0
(n)
=
1
c2
H + η0 + r
"
η
0u(n) − K(c) + (c
2
H − c ¯ C
N)V
N0
(n) + c
∞ X
m=1
V
N0
(n + m)c
N
mµ
N
m
#
.
Multiplying this inequality by c2
H + η + r, adding ( ¯ CN c − c2
H)V N0
(n), dividing by
c ¯ CN + r + η, and maximizing over c, we get
V
N0
≥ M V
N0
,
where the M operator is deﬁned in Lemma C.1, corresponding to cN . Since M is
monotone, we get
V
N0
≥ M
k V
N0
for any k ∈ N. By Lemma C.1 and Corollary C.2,
lim
k→∞
M
k V
N0
= V
N,
and the proof is complete.
D.2 Nash Equilibria
We deﬁne the operator Q : `∞ → `∞ by
(Q ˜ C)(n) = argmax
c
 
η0u(n) − K(c)
¯ Cc + r + η0 +
c
¯ Cc + r + η0
∞ X
m=1
V
˜ C(n + m)µ
˜ C(m)
!
,
where
V
˜ C(n) = max
c
 
η0u(n) − K(c)
¯ Cc + r + η0 +
c
¯ Cc + r + η0
∞ X
m=1
V
˜ C(n + m)µ
˜ C(m)
!
.
We then deﬁne the N(N) ⊂ N as
N(N) =
￿
n ∈ N;C
n ∈ Q(C
N)
￿
.
The following proposition is a direct consequence of Proposition 5.4 and the deﬁ-
nition of the correspondence N.
Proposition D.4 Symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game are given by
trigger policies with trigger precision levels that are the ﬁxed points of the correspondence
N.
50Lemma D.5 The correspondence N(N) is monotone increasing in N.
Proof. From the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (6),
(r + η
0)V
N
n = max
c∈[cL,cH]
η
0un + c
 
−κ +
∞ X
m=1
￿
V
N
n+m − V
N
n
￿
C
N
m µ
N
m
!
.
Let ﬁrst cL > 0. Then, it is optimal for an agent to choose c = cH if
−κ +
∞ X
m=1
￿
V
N
n+m − V
N
n
￿
C
N
m µ
N
m > 0 ⇔ (r + η
0)V
N
n − η
0un > 0, (48)
the agent is indiﬀerent between choosing cH or cL if
−κ +
∞ X
m=1
￿
V
N
n+m − V
N
n
￿
C
N
m µ
N
m = 0 ⇔ (r + η
0)V
N
n − η
0un = 0, (49)
and the agent will choose cL if the inequality < holds in (48). By Lemma C.3, the set
of n for which (r + η0)V N
n − η0un = 0 is either empty or is an interval N1 ≤ n ≤ N2.
Proposition D.3 implies the required monotonicity.
Let now cL = 0. Then, by the same reasoning, it is optimal for an agent to choose
c = cH if and only if (r + η0)V N
n − η0un > 0. Alternatively, (r + η0)V N
n − η0un = 0.
By Lemma C.3, the set n for which (r + η0)V N
n − η0un > 0 is an interval n < N1
and hence (r + η0)V N
n − η0un = 0 for all n ≥ N1. Consequently, since un is monotone
increasing and concave, the sequence
Zn := −κ +
∞ X
m=1
￿
V
N
n+m − V
N
n
￿
C
N
m µ
N
m = −κ +
η0
r + η0
∞ X
m=1
(un+m − un) C
N
m µ
N
m
is decreasing for n ≥ N1. Therefore, the set of n for which Zn = 0 is either empty or is
an interval N1 ≤ n ≤ N2. Proposition 4.3 implies the required monotonicity.
Proposition D.6 The correspondence N has at least one ﬁxed point. Any ﬁxed point
is less than or equal to N .
Proof. If 0 ∈ N(0), we are done. Otherwise, inf{N(0)} ≥ 1. By monotonicity,
inf{N(1) } ≥ 1. Again, if 1 ∈ N(1), we are done. Otherwise, continue inductively.
Since there is only a ﬁnite number N of possible outcomes, we must arrive at some n
in N(n).
Proof of Proposition 6.4. The result follows directly from Proposition D.3 and the
deﬁnition of equilibrium.
51D.3 Equilibria with minimal search intensity
Lemma D.7 The operator A is a contraction on `∞ with
kAk`∞→`∞ ≤
c2
L
r + η0 + c2
L
< 1.
Furthermore, A preserves positivity, monotonicity, and concavity.
Proof of Lemma 6.5. We have, for any bounded sequence g,
|A(g)n| ≤
c2
L
r + η0 + c2
L
∞ X
m=1
|gn+m|µm ≤
c2
L
r + η0 + c2
L
sup
n
gn, (50)
which establishes the ﬁrst claim. Furthermore, if g is increasing, we have gn1+m ≥
gn2+m for n1 ≥ n2 , and for any m. Summing up these inequalities, we get the required
monotonicity. Preservation of concavity is proved similarly.
Proof of Theorem 6.6. It suﬃces to show that, taking the minimal-search (µ0,C0)
behavior as given, the minimal-eﬀort search eﬀort cL achieves the supremum deﬁned by
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, at each precision n, if and only if K0(cL) ≥ B,
where B is deﬁned by (8).
By the previous lemma, V (n) is concave in n. Thus, the sequence
∞ X
m=1
(Vn+m − Vn)µ
0
m
is monotone decreasing with n. Therefore,
∞ X
m=1
(V1+m − V1)µ
0
m = max
n
∞ X
m=1
(Vn+m − Vn)µ
0
m.
We need to show that the objective function, mapping c to
−K(c) + ccL
∞ X
m=1
(Vn+m − Vn)µ
0
m,
achieves its maximum at c = cL . Because K is convex, this objective function is
decreasing on [cL , cH], and the claim follows.
The following lemma follows directly from the proof of Proposition D.6.
Lemma D.8 If CN ∈ Q(C1) for some N ≥ 1 then the correspondence N has a ﬁxed
point n ≥ 1.
52Proof of Proposition 6.7. By the above lemma, it suﬃces to show that Q(C1) 6= C0 .
Suppose on the contrary that Q(C1) = C0 . Then the value function is simply
V
1
n =
η0 u(n)
r + η0 .
It follows from (48) that C1 = 0 is optimal if and only if
η0 (u(2) − u(1))cHµ1
1
r + η0 =
∞ X
m=1
￿
V
1
n+m − V
N
n
￿
C
1
m µ
N
m < κ.
By (48), we will have the inequality V 1
n ≥ V 0
n for all n ≥ 2 and a strict inequality
V 1
1 > V 0
1 . Thus, the C1 equilibrium strictly Pareto dominates the no-search equilibrium.
The proof is complete.
E Proofs of Results in Section 7, Policy Interventions
Proof of Lemma 7.1. By construction, the value function V δ associated with pro-
portional search subsidy rate δ is monotone increasing in δ. By (48), the optimal trigger
N is that n at which the sequence
(r + η
0)V
δ
n − η
0 u(n)
crosses zero. Hence, the optimal trigger is also monotone increasing in δ .
Proof of Lemma 7.3. Letting Vn,M denote the value associated with n private signals
and M public signals, we deﬁne
Zn,M = Vn,M −
η0un+M
r + η0 .
We can rewrite the HJB equation for the agent, educated with M signals at birth, in the
form
(r + η
0)Zn,M = sup
c∈[cL,cH]
c
 
−κ +
∞ X
m=1
(Vn+m,M − Vn,M)µ
C
m
!
= sup
c∈[cL,cH]
c
 
Wn,M − κ +
∞ X
m=1
(Zn+m,M − Zn,M)µ
C
m
!
,
where
Wn,M =
η0
r + η0
∞ X
m=1
(un+M+m − un+M)µ
C
m.
53The quantity Wn,M is monotone decreasing with M and n by the concavity of u(·).
Equivalently,
Zn,M = sup
c∈[cL,cH]
c
¯ C c + r + η0
 
Wn,M − κ +
∞ X
m=1
Zn+m,M µ
C
m
!
. (51)
Treating the right-hand side as the image of an operator at Z, this operator is a con-
traction and, by Lemma C.2, Zn,M is its unique ﬁxed point. Since Wn,M decreases with
M, so does Zn,M .
By Lemma C.3, Zn,M is also monotone decreasing with n. Hence, an optimal trigger
policy, attaining the supremum in (51), is an n at which the sequence
Wn,M − κ +
∞ X
m=1
Zn+m,M µ
C
m
crosses zero. Because both Wn,M and Zn,M are decreasing with M, the trigger is also
decreasing with M .
Proof of Proposition 7.4. Suppose that CN is an equilibrium with M public signals,
which we express as
C
N ∈ QM(C
N).
By Lemma 7.3, we have
C
N1 ∈ QM−1(C
N)
for some N1 ≥ N . It follows from the algorithm at the end of Section 6 that there exists
some N0 ≥ N with N0 ∈ QM−1(CN0). The proof is completed by induction in M.
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